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Hegel’s theory of moral action:  
the obligations and limits of Sittlichkeit 
§1| Introduction 
Hegel’s continued attack on Kantian morality and, above all, on the empty 
formalism of the categorical imperative motivates his postulation of an 
immanent, as opposed to a transcendental, doctrine of duty.1  The subject’s 
duties are found embedded in Sittlichkeit, his ethical substance or moral 
fabric, from which he derives the determinations of his will; thus motivations 
for action do not originate from transcendental reason, but from the agent’s 
institutional role(s) within the rational state.  It is this explicitly social origin of 
motivations which has led to the diverse interpretations and judgements on 
Hegel’s account of the state.  On the one hand, he is accused of political 
quietism: if a subject is free through the fulfilment of his social role, then 
seemingly the possibility of protest in terms of a moral conscience is ruled out 
since to protest is to obviously fail to fulfil one’s role.2  On the other hand, the 
moral conscience is held to be a fundamental and necessary attribute of the 
rational state and, if it is absent, then neither the individual nor the state is fully 
free.3  The aim of this paper is not to interrogate these different 
interpretations, but rather to see whether the issue concerning the role of the 
moral conscience in Hegel’s social theory can be answered through an 
exploration of one of the building blocks in his account of the rational state; 
that is, his much neglected theory of moral action.   
Hegel, like most political theorists, sees the state as a way to embody, 
protect and make possible a fundamental human value, viz. freedom.  His 
social theory is structured so that Hegel offers an account of human nature 
and then describes the political system which best protects and makes 
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possible authentic human existence.4  The debate, then, over the role of the 
moral conscience within Sittlichkeit can perhaps be resolved through a 
consideration of a significant element of Hegel’s account of human nature, 
that is his theory of moral action, since this discussion forms the bridge 
between metaphysical freedom [PR, §7] and social freedom [PR, §142] by 
laying the foundations for practical freedom which will be embodied in and 
made possible by Sittlichkeit.   
The rejection of Kant is, after all, only the negative part of Hegel’s 
argument which grounds the idea of Sittlichkeit.  The basis for the immanent 
doctrine of duty is twofold: negatively in the failure of a universal, 
transcendental account of duty; and positively, in Hegel’s theory of action.  
Yet, it is only the former, negative argument which is widely known and 
discussed.5  This aim of this article is to argue that the movement from an 
account of universal rationality to objective, social freedom is already 
positively involved and necessary to Hegel’s own theory of action.  Further, 
when the theory of action is elaborated, it should be clear that the place of 
moral subjectivity in Sittlichkeit cannot be underestimated and the charge of 
quietism may be misplaced. 
This paper will, therefore, concentrate on the implicit embodiment of 
an immanent, free and subjectively endorsed doctrine of duty within Hegel’s 
abstract theory of action.  The issue at stake can best be summarised in the 
question: what part does his theory of action play in establishing the 
subjective claims inherent in Sittlichkeit?  To answer this it is first necessary to 
interrogate Hegel’s most mature account of action as found in the 
Philosophy of Right §§105-140 and the Philosophy of Mind §§503-512. 
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§2| Moral Freedom and the Theory of Action 
Hegel’s theory of action is to be found under the heading of “Morality” in 
both the Philosophy of Mind and the Philosophy of Right, mediating the 
sections “Abstract Right” and “Ethical Life [Sittlichkeit]”.  The former section is 
concerned with personal freedom which is the rights and prohibitions of the 
discrete self as differentiated from the clan or the tribe; claims which involve 
the recognition and identification of individual persons as rights-bearers with 
particular desires.  Without the historical and philosophical emergence of the 
person (a distinct and discrete element of the tribe), there would be no 
possibility of the subjective freedom of “I (as individual) want x.”  The latter 
section, “Ethical Life”, is concerned with the positive duties and obligations of 
the citizen in the rational state: the good-for-me and the good-for-all of the 
rational social being must be mediated and harmonised by positive 
obligations entailed by and arising from the subject's various roles in ethical 
life. 
“Morality” concerns the transition – both developmental and historical 
– from what the agent ought not to do, to what he ought to do; from person 
to subject: “The free individual, who, in mere law, counts only as a person, is 
now characterised as a subject – a will reflected into itself so that, be its 
affection what it may, it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the 
existence of freedom in an external thing.”  [EG, §503]  Moral freedom is also 
a precondition of social freedom: ethical life is not mine until I as moral agent 
recognise it as a good and in order to do this, I must be a moral agent who 
can rationally endorse it.  It is for this reason that, even though the Greeks 
had a harmonious ethical substance, they were not fully free because the 
substance was, in some sense, not theirs. [VPG, pp. 137-8/106-7] 
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With the person, law enables or obstructs the satisfaction of his 
subjective freedom (‘I want x’).  Law determines the claims of individuals 
within a group and the individual, as a rights-bearer, has to respect the wills 
of other persons because negation of their rights would entail his non-
recognition as a person (and, therefore, the alienation of his freedom).  
Personal freedom is merely in itself, an external purpose imposed on him, be it 
by immediate inclination or blind obedience to the dictates of authority. 
The subject, the moral point of view, on the other hand, demands 
more: he is aware that his actions have to obey positive obligations, the 
‘good’, so that they can express his identity to others: “Its utterance in deed 
with this freedom is as action, in the externality of which it only admits as its 
own, and allows to be imputed to it, so much as it has consciously willed.” 
[EG, §503]  The subject is not only prohibited from acting in certain ways, he is 
also obliged by himself to act in certain ways and his will is no longer merely in 
itself.  Through reflection, the reason becomes known to the agent or, to put it 
in Hegel’s idiom, is for itself rational.  As such, the intention becomes 
something inward, the content of the will is transcended and questioned: is 
this good for me?  Hegel puts it thus: “Only in the will as subjective will can 
freedom, or the will which has being in itself, be actual.” [PR, §106]   
It is the subject’s purpose, which reflects an inwardness as opposed to 
the external nature of the person, that is most readily named moral freedom: 
This subjective or ‘moral’ freedom is what a European especially 
calls freedom.  In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a 
personal knowledge of the distinction between good and evil in 
general: ethical and religious principles shall not merely lay their 
claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be 
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obeyed, but have their assent, recognition, or even justification in 
his heart, sentiment, conscience, intelligence, etc.  The subjectivity 
of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. 
[EG, §503] 
Here, Hegel is offering his own version of the Kantian characterisation of 
Enlightenment, and one cannot fail to see the parallel with Kant’s earlier 
portrayal of the spirit of his age: 
Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be 
subjected.  The sacredness of religion, and the authority of 
legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from 
the examination of this tribunal.  But, if they are exempted, they 
become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to 
sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has 
stood the test of a free and public examination.6 
It is significant to note that the claim of the Enlightenment is the identifying 
mark of moral freedom: it is the coming to age of man.  To use a traditional 
analogy, man has grown into maturity and no longer need rely on the 
dictates of authority or the motivations of immediate inclination (including 
social character).  When the child wears his seatbelt because his mother tells 
him to, he is displaying personal freedom.  When he comes of age and 
recognises the validity of the reason as a reason for him, binding on him 
whether his mother and her law are present or not, then he is exercising moral 
freedom.7 
The will which obeys authority or immediate inclination acts only in itself, 
it is not aware of the rationality of purpose.  Hegel, in the above quotation, 
celebrates this modern, moral freedom; it is, for him, necessary for full, human 
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freedom and any ethical substance which did not recognise and value it 
would be incomplete and not therefore rational.  The subject inaugurates 
interrogation of one’s purposes: he asks if the ‘I want x’ is a good-for-him, and 
if he perceives it so, he claims responsibility for the purpose as his own. 
 The inwardness of the moral will involves the agent in relations with 
others, for in acting upon a reason for itself, the subject seeks to be 
recognised as a subject over and above his claim to personhood, that is as 
an agent who acts for a reason for-himself and not from blind obedience or 
instinct.  The agent’s action is meant to reflect the positive content of his 
purpose and be recognised by others as ‘good’, so the subject’s responsibility 
has to lie, in part, in the others' recognition of his will in the act.  If the deed is 
the alteration in the external world brought about by the will, the action is 
that part of the deed for which the subject can claim responsibility.  [EG, 
§504]  These two are, of course, not identical: in opening a door in ignorance 
and accidentally knocking the decorator off his ladder, the subject is only 
responsible for actually opening the door.  His deed may have been to knock 
over the decorator, but his action was to open the door.8  The part for which 
the subject is responsible is that to which the predicate ‘mine’ can be 
attached and that is traceable to the subject’s reason for action.  [PR, §115]  
Thus, the act is to be described not in terms of a purpose (the particular will’s 
cognisance of an external principle in terms of an internal motivation such as 
fear) but the intention (the universal intelligibility which others will understand 
in my act):  
Purpose concerns only the formal condition that the external will 
should also be present within me as an internal element.  In the 
second moment, on the other hand, the question arises of the 
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intention behind the action – that is, of the relative value of the 
action in relation to me.  And lastly, the third moment is not just the 
relative value of the action, but its universal value, the good. [PR, 
§114, addition]   
If a purpose is not recognised internally by the agent, then it cannot be 
the free will of a subject.  Alternatively, it might be external in form such as 
deep unconscious motivations, the precepts of authority or, more strongly, 
coercion or natural causality.  These all serve to explain an action, but they 
do not necessarily make the agent responsible for the act.  For Hegel, only 
when the subject is recognised as responsible for his act (as the external 
expression of intention) is he fully free.  Obviously, then, he has to characterise 
the way in which subjects are held responsible for their actions.  He outlines 
the basis for subjective responsibility in a crucial paragraph:  
The expression of the will as subjective or moral is action.  Action 
contains the following determinations: (α) it must be known by me 
in its externality as mine; (β) its essential relation to the concept is 
one of obligation; and (γ) it has an essential relation to the will of 
others. [PR, §113] 
(α) The first of these criteria demands a right of knowledge: the 
intention of the agent must be known to the agent himself.  Hegel argues 
that to act from a given, immediate or natural reason is not an actualisation 
of freedom, the agent must recognise in his action the end to which it is 
projected; thus agents who act from deep psychoses, hypnosis or external 
determinations, do not act freely.  This element emphasises the first-person 
priority of the knowledge of an act in that the subject of the moral will (not 
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necessarily the person, though) has the best access to his intentions.  For, it is 
the moral will, in contrast to the simple desiring will, which has authority over 
its actions.  Hegel elsewhere describes the moral will as “inviolable” and 
“inaccessible”; that is, the subject is privileged in his description of his purpose 
and ought not to be contradicted unless it is absolutely necessary.9 [PR, §106, 
addition]  This point of view forms the basis of moral freedom: “The agent has 
no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the action, in point 
of its matter, is not something external to him, but is a particularity of his own – 
that it contains his needs, interests, and aims.” [EG, §505]  The intention of the 
agent is his own well-being, that is his good, so that an obligation arises from 
the very nature of intention: this is a reason for me in that it is my ‘good’.  (A 
good, one should stress, which is not exclusively moral in nature, it can also be 
self-regarding pr prudential.)  Therefore, the subject only claims responsibility 
for those acts in which he satisfies his own free desires, projects and 
aspirations. 
(β) Secondly, action demonstrates the subject’s essential humanity in 
that holding the end to be a binding good, he posits an external relationship 
to it of obligation or duty.  The animal has no choice but to obey its desires, 
neither does the small child; they bear little responsibility for their actions: 
subjective freedom for them – and to a similar extent for the person – resides 
in the satisfaction of the will’s desire whatever its content may be.  With fully 
developed subjects, values override other desires and they recognise that 
the (apparently) external ends of actions necessarily belong to the subjects 
themselves.  Values are not to be understood in opposition to desires, rather 
they are the articulation of desires which the subject believes are worth 
having.10  And, to repeat, these values need not be exclusively moral since 
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responsibility concerns all self-regarding actions (self-interest, prudence and 
morality).11  The process described above as interrogation permits the 
recognition of the ‘good’ of the subject’s purpose, be it moral or prudential, 
and he perceives it not only as a desire to be satisfied (personal freedom) but 
a desire worth satisfying (moral freedom).  Responsibility requires that the 
subject self-consciously know and freely choose his purpose for the predicate 
‘mine’ to be attached to the action. 
(γ) Thirdly, it is necessary that others recognise the action as one’s own.  
The action must express the implicit humanity (obligation) rather than appear 
to be a mere, immediate purpose and this entails that others must concur 
with me and my description of the good, otherwise they will continue to treat 
me under the category of personhood.  Intention, therefore, requires 
recognition by others: “The implementation of my end therefore has this 
identity of my will and the will of others within in it – it has a positive reference 
to the will of others.”  [PR, §112]  The first-person may be the sole judge of 
what is good, but his judgement is constrained by the interpretation of the 
other.  The agent has to be aware that his act ought to accord with the 
expectations of his form of life, otherwise his intention will be either 
misdescribed or ignored.  First-person accounts of action must be intelligible 
to the other and this requires a standard, communal scheme of 
interpretation.  The third criterion holds that the intention must be validated 
by the other.   
One way to characterise this is to say that the justification of one’s 
good or end involves one in the activity of reason-giving and this activity is, 
for Hegel, inherently social.  There are no constraints on a will which justifies a 
good or a purpose to itself, one is able to convince oneself that anything 
Hegel’s theory of moral action 
 
10 
 
may be good.  Reasons for action require a degree of objectivity for Hegel 
and this is based on reasons being a justification for all men who share my 
way of life rather than just for me; that is, an actual reason rather than just 
wilfulness.  Thus, in giving reasons, the agent knows if they are good reasons if 
he can convince others.  It follows from this that the agent’s description of his 
intention must harmonise with the other’s interpretation of the act.  A man 
unaware of the way in which a certain act will be interpreted, that is how his 
reasons for action will be reconstructed (the tourist abroad) is not responsible 
for any offence caused (although he still may be held culpable).12  
Reciprocally, the agent is only fully free when he is aware how his action will 
be interpreted.  The will of others contained in one’s own will is this shared 
scheme of interpretation in and through which we reconstruct intentions. 
 To briefly recapitulate, Hegel’s theory of action arises from a 
consideration of the responsible subject.  He sketches what he believes are 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for free, moral (to use his broad term) 
action.  It is necessary that the intention be known to the agent.  People who 
act from neuroses or hidden motivations are not responsible for their acts.  
However, this is not sufficient: it could possibly be the case that a neurotic 
was aware of a deep trauma motivating a specific symptom, but still be 
unable to act otherwise.  More explicitly, the coerced agent cannot be a 
free agent: the bank teller who hands over the money to the armed robber is 
not truly doing what he wants even though he is aware of his own intention.  
Therefore, the subject has to freely endorse his end.  Hegel puts this in terms of 
obligation: the intention is to be known as a good-for-me.  In the case of 
coercion, the bank teller has a conflict of goods: self-preservation versus 
fulfilling his role.  The former motivation trumps the latter but the agent is not 
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free because he is not acting from his own will, it is the presence of an 
external factor which obstructs his free action.   
It would seem that these two are necessary and sufficient conditions 
for free action, yet Hegel adds his third determination: the intention has to be 
capable of reconstruction by others from the objectivity of the act itself.  
Hegel’s originality resides in this third criterion, his theory of action retains the 
traditional concept of the right of knowledge of the subject, but tempers it 
with an objective constraint.  Why is it that Hegel feels it necessary to invoke 
this third criterion? 
 The three determinations of action are further developed in a later 
paragraph, which names the two other rights over and above that of 
knowledge: 
The right of intention is that the universal quality of the action shall 
have being not only in itself, but shall be known by the agent and 
thus have been present all along in his subjective will; and 
conversely, what we may call the right of the objectivity of the 
action is the right of the action to assert itself as known and willed 
by the subject as a thinking agent. [PR, §120] 
The right of intention entails that the description of an agent’s intention must 
be true and the agent must recognise it as such.  Moreover, the intention 
must be determined by the right of objectivity of the action whereby the 
interpretation of the will’s intention requires a standard model of meaning; 
that is, a communal, inter-subjective understanding through which actions 
are to be recognised, categorised and judged.  Without the self-certainty 
granted by knowledge of these categories, the subject is always unsure 
whether or not he has been properly recognised or if his intention can be 
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reconstructed faithfully from his action.13  The tourist abroad is not fully 
responsible until such time as he comprehends the way in which his actions 
are to be judged.  To do this, he has to understand the expectations of others 
as constituted by the demands of ethical life, customs and social mores.  
Sittlichkeit is necessary for and supplements moral freedom in that it makes 
the recognition of a subject’s intention certain.  It is for this reason that the first 
two criteria on their own are not sufficient for Hegel; without the moment of 
certain recognition, the agent cannot be fully, morally responsible. 
Action and responsibility, for Hegel, entail, firstly, the right of knowledge 
which holds that the reason on which the subject acts has to first be 
transcended and interrogated in terms of appropriateness: “the fact that this 
moment of the particularity of the agent is contained and implemented in its 
action constitutes subjective freedom in its more concrete determination, i.e. 
the right of the subject to find its satisfaction in the action.” [PR, §121]  
Subjective, moral freedom arises from the right of knowledge (this is my 
intention) coupled with the right of intention (is this a good for me).  It is more 
than the subjective freedom of the person constitutive of “Abstract Right”: 
the ‘I want x’ becomes ‘I want x because it is (a) good for me’. 
 Yet, moral freedom has to be constrained by the right of objectivity.  If 
the subject’s acts are to be the expression of inwardness, then he must be 
certain that the other is going to reconstruct them faithfully.  They must share 
a common understanding of the way in which acts are to be rendered 
intelligible.  Such an understanding can only be inferred from inhabiting a 
shared form of life with its conception of the good and goods.  The good-for-
me of the subject, if valid, has to accord with the good of his social situation 
as interpreted via the variety of roles he occupies in his form of life.  The agent 
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knows the good in question because it is made immediately available to him 
through fulfilling his roles in the family (parent, child), civil society (worker) and 
the state (citizen).  If I wish to be known as a good father, then my acts must 
accord with those judgements which accompany a good parent (love, 
generosity, discipline) and not those which are generally frowned upon 
(indifference, prodigality, severity).  However, the three modern institutions 
(family, civil society, political state proper) are only the most formal 
descriptions of those categories by which I will be judged, for within these my 
duties arise from my role in the family, my class and vocation in civil society 
and also my political sphere. 
The freedom of the person is abstract right, which involves the right to 
demand satisfaction of one’s own individual wants and desires with minimal 
consideration of others. [PR, §36]14  This freedom is both made possible by 
and tempered the objective requirements of property and law.  [PR, §41]  
Abstract right has not been discussed in any detail above, but Hegel may 
well have Locke’s insights in mind here: my right to life and liberty (my right to 
want and satisfy x) are precarious unless situated within a context of property 
(in order fro them to be substantial) and law (in order for them to be 
respected).15  The freedom of the subject is moral action, which involves the 
elements of personal freedom, but adds an account of the endorsement of 
reasons for action as my own and not mere inclination or dictates, a practice 
which is made possible and tempered by the objective realm of good 
reasons as legitimated by my peers.  And, as was stated earlier, these 
elements are further developed into the two constraints of social freedom.  
The freedom of the ethical person is social freedom, which once again 
involves subjective and objective elements.16  Furthermore, as was originally 
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claimed and can now begun to be seen, it is the moral freedom of the 
subject which forms the basis of social freedom: the right of knowledge 
develops into subjective social freedom and the right of objectivity of the act 
develops into objective social freedom.17 
The two elements of social freedom and their relationship to one 
another are first characterised as: 
The right to recognize nothing that I do not perceive as rational is 
the highest right of the subject, but by virtue of its subjective 
determination, it is at the same time formal; on the other hand, the 
right of the rational – as the objective – over the subject remains 
firmly established.  
Subjective social freedom stipulates that a law, institution or even a 
conventional cultural more be recognised as valid for the agent by himself.  
This is crucial otherwise it is possible to describe the coerced or deceived as 
free when it is done in their own good.  However, this is only formal because 
the subject cannot generate good for himself.  Yet, this formal condition of 
the subjective will – that I, as moral agent, be able to endorse the good – 
should not be undervalued: any society in which formal endorsement is 
impossible – that is, any society that does not maintain the enlightened, moral 
subject – is unfree because I am unable to recognise my own freely endorsed 
goods and, hence, I am not a fully free agent.   
Objective social freedom is the institutional and social structure of the 
world which makes it possible for the person or subject to satisfy his subjective 
freedom.  Hegel’s substantial account of objective freedom is complex and 
extensive, but it is enough to describe two main features (though, these are 
not the only ones): (1) laws and institutions of the rational state have to secure 
Hegel’s theory of moral action 
 
15 
 
the basic material needs of the members so that agents are not bound by 
their immediate desires (they are free from dependence); and (2) it must be 
possible for agents to endorse the laws of the rational state and recognise 
their underlying rationality such that it is something which they would freely 
do.18  Hence, the nuclear, bourgeois family frees the individual from 
dependency on the sexual drive without obstructing his personal freedom as 
did earlier familial structures.  Similarly, civil society frees the agent from 
dependency on material needs.  Moreover, both institutions enforce 
individual rights and inform the agent of his duties in such a way that his 
character develops to become free and reflective: the family develops 
one’s moral subjectivity, whereas civil society is instrumental in the formation 
of the agent as a discrete, particular individual with different wants from all 
others.  Taken together, they supply an identity, a sense of self in which the 
agent is certain of recognition by others without surrendering any of his 
particularity. 
In fact, part of this satisfaction made possible by objective freedom 
resides in the certainty of recognition.  Whether it be the regulations of civil 
society which govern transactional and property law satisfying the subjective 
freedom of the person (I want x), to the more robust and complex institutions 
of the rational state which satisfy the subjective freedom of the moral subject 
(I want x because it is (a) good), the roles and dictates of ethical life not only 
determine the content of the will, but they also allow the other to recognise, 
categorise and judge the acts of the subject.  
The right of knowledge and the right of intention drawn together in the 
right of objectivity constrain full, moral action and necessitate the movement 
to an objective, immanent doctrine of ethics.  In the passage cited above, 
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Hegel deliberately runs together objectivity and the rational as the true 
determinations of the subject. [PR, §132, remark]  Ethical life is not merely a 
form of life which determines and harmonises the good, rather it is a rational 
order of determinations which harmonise due to their implicit order.  The 
difference can be understood in that the former case holds only that the 
objective, institutional order coupled with the subjective knowledge of these 
determinations constrain the actions of the subject within the bounds of 
intelligibility given whichever form of life; or just because humans happen to 
exist in communities.  The latter – Hegelian – position holds, on the contrary, 
that objective freedom satisfies the requirements of the subjective will since 
moral subjectivity demands a characterisation of the good but is unable to 
generate it for itself.  Objective freedom – the right of the rational – satisfies 
the requirements of personal freedom in civil society (the possibility to satisfy ‘I 
want x’) and also moral freedom in a robust and substantial account of the 
good (the possibility to identify and recognise the ‘I want x because it is a 
good’).  Without this objectivity, the moral will would fail because it cannot 
inwardly determine the nature of the good.  Conversely, objective freedom 
which is not rational and is only immediate in the reality of the subject's form 
of life, is a blind authority which determines the subject without the moment 
of transparency essential to full, human freedom.  It is an external authority 
acting as a cause of rather than a reason for action.  
Subjective (both personal and moral) and objective freedom are 
implicit in and arise from Hegel’s theory of action and, furthermore, that the 
fact that they originate in his discussion of “Morality” is necessary in order to 
bridge metaphysical freedom and social freedom.  Hegel’s originality lies in 
the right of the objectivity of the act, which is a necessary condition for 
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action since it supplies the certainty of recognition required for responsibility.  
The modern moral subject would not be fully free unless there is an objective 
account of the good which constrains the identification and recognition of 
intentions (objective freedom) and reciprocally the formal moment that 
these goods be endorsed as freely chosen goods of a particular agent 
(subjective freedom).  [PR, §§7, 23] 
 
§3| The necessity of the right of objectivity for responsibility 
The critique of Kant is the negative reason for the appropriation of an 
immanent doctrine of duty, but given Hegel’s moral theory of action, it can 
also be read in another way.  The point by point attack on a transcendental 
moral will supports the assumption that the right of objectivity is a necessary 
condition for responsible action.  It would be pertinent just to offer a brief 
reminder of these points: 
 (1) The moral point of view has to be constrained because it is infinitely 
powerful and can posit (or negate) any good whatsoever as universal good.  
Due to the abstract nature of the Good, the conscience can endorse any 
content subjectively. [EG, §§510, 511]  Pathological examples of this 
phenomenon include asceticism, the Terror of revolutions and the stance of 
irony:  
Although it has a relation to this objectivity, it at the same time 
distances itself from it and knows itself as that which wills and 
resolves in a particular way but may equally well will and resolve 
otherwise. – ‘You in fact honestly accept a law as existing in and 
for itself’ [it says to others]; ‘I do so, too, but I go further than you, 
for I am also beyond this law and can do this or that as I please.  It 
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is not the thing which is excellent, it is I who am excellent and 
master of both law and thing; I merely play with them as with my 
own caprice, and in this ironic consciousness in which I let the 
highest of things perish, I merely enjoy myself.’ [PR, §140, remark] 
The ironic stance negates the objectivity of value in favour of its own 
individual power, that of the subjective will of the agent: “… it is no longer 
someone else’s authority or assertion that counts, but the subject itself, i.e. its 
own conviction, which can alone make something good.” [PR, §140, remark]  
Here it is only necessary to remind the reader that, for Hegel, reason-giving is 
a social and not a theoretical activity, certainty can only be granted to the 
subject from another subject not from himself. 
(2) The belief that the rationality of the subjective will can supply 
determinations for the will from pure reason is simply misguided because it is 
too abstract. [EG, §§506,508]  The subject is unable to generate 
determinations of the will out of his reflective understanding, its abstractness 
needs to be overcome by objective determinations; that is, the individual 
can only be free in an objective, moral order which expresses his intelligibility 
and informs his intentions as to the way in which their external nature will be 
comprehended by others; that is, in a moral fabric which makes the 
satisfaction of his rational desires and aspirations possible.  Universal values 
such as respect, sympathy, goodness are available for the subject but how 
one is able to express them is relative to the substantial moral fabric which 
one inhabits.  Shaking someone’s hand might be a sign of respect, but it 
could just as equally be an action which causes great offence.  Hegel’s point 
is simply that the nature of universal moral imperatives which are derived 
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from reason is not that they are wrong, but simply that they need to be 
substantial and substance comes from social practices. [PR, §261, addition] 
(3) The subjective will cannot overcome conflicts of duty.  The 
subjective will unconstrained by the right of objectivity will generate 
contradictions with three main origins: first, between the many kinds of duties 
(family versus the state). [EG, §508]  Secondly, conflicts between self-interest 
and other duties (my particular well-being versus the duties of my workplace). 
[EG, §509]  The problem with conflicts of duty is a deep one for Hegel 
because he finds Kant’s division of reason from inclination uncomfortable.  
Freedom is self-determination, but if duty contradicts happiness can I truly be 
said to be acting from my own will if it is true that I still want what I did not do?  
Kant will say that the rational self is the true self, but Hegel cannot accept 
that since the human is a sensuous creature, so he assumes that happiness 
and inclination should not be excluded by reason. 
The significance of these points can be exemplified through the use of 
one of the  most commonly invoked moral conflicts: the mother who has to 
decide whether or not to steal to feed her starving child.  The immediate 
determination of the family, the naturally binding duty of the maternal bond, 
gives rise to the desire to protect, feed and sustain the child.  This is the good-
for-mother.  Yet, her role in civil society determines that she recognise the 
rationality of the right to property and this, too, is a good.  The universality of 
good means that these two goods should harmonise, yet the moral 
conscience is quite able to accept one as right at the expense of the other in 
one moment, then – in the next second – to reverse such a description.  For 
Hegel, the moral conscience itself cannot decide between conflicting 
determinations of the will and, if it does so, such a decision is wholly arbitrary.  
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The solution is to make a demand on ethical life: what is it that gives rise to 
the conflict?  That a child be fed is a good and that the right of property be 
respected is a good, so such a society in which a conflict between these two 
is felt, is not rational.  The conflict can only be overcome when objective 
freedom, granted by the institutions of ethical life, eradicates the existence of 
the mother's need to steal and her subjective freedom can be satisfied.  
(Through the supply of basic needs as a right (the welfare state) and the 
eradication of poverty, or legal recognition of her subjective freedom 
adjudicated in a court.) 
Hegel realises that the abstract nature of the good cannot be created 
from the top down and theoretically tested.  It is not truly possible for the 
agent to declare what the world ought to be like in all certainty given the 
dictates of reason.  Instead, the moral subject must begin from the existing 
world and its institutions since the constraint of objectivity involves the idea 
that the good must be intelligible to these institutions.  Only in such a way can 
subjective freedom meet the constraint of objective freedom and, 
reciprocally, it is this very objective freedom which grants the subject the 
certainty of recognition he requires to satisfy his actions.  Therefore, it is only 
the ethical person who is truly free: 
The ethical person is conscious of the content of his action as 
something necessary, something that is valid in and for itself, and 
this consciousness is so far from diminishing freedom, that, on the 
contrary, it is only through this consciousness that his abstract 
freedom becomes a freedom that is actual and rich in content, as 
distinct from freedom of choice [Willkür], a freedom that still lacks 
content and is merely possible. [EL, §158, addition] 
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The objective freedom of ethical life makes possible the satisfaction of 
rational desires, projects and aspirations and this is an elaboration of the right 
of objectivity present in the abstract theory of action; a right which renders 
apparent the requirement of shared categories from which the subjective 
intention can reliably be reconstructed (as in the case of the mother).  Ethical 
life is the substantial description of the possible determinations of one of its 
members and is, then, liberation and freedom because it purifies and 
rationalises the drives of the individual. [PR, §19]  Objective freedom is 
freedom because it liberates the subject in three ways: (α) from a 
dependence on immediate drives; (β) from having to produce the 
categories for comprehension (values, rights and duties) for himself ex nihilo; 
and (γ) from the need to determine good from his own conscience. [PR, 
§149]  The three institutions of modern society – that is, the liberal, bourgeois 
family, civil society and the modern political state – all combine to fulfil these 
conditions of objective freedom.  It is these determinations of ethical life 
which constitute the objective freedom of the subject in that they enable him 
to satisfy his desires, wants and aspirations, to simultaneously pursue the 
good, and to be certain of recognition by the other. [EG, §538]  Hegel’s 
claim, then, is that the subject as he has described it in “Morality” can only be 
fully free when his or her objective freedom is secured by these modern 
institutions. 
 Sittlichkeit is, in one sense, the world constructed by social reasons for 
actions.  It supplies motivations and obligations for the agent in virtue of his 
membership and his role in this institutional order.  A red traffic light does not 
cause a driver to stop, it means stop and the driver’s response is a habit 
arising from the institution of driving.  Similarly, clouds are a reason for carrying 
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an umbrella and not the cause of carrying the umbrella.  Clouds cause rain, 
and the habitual response (as supplied by social mores and customs) to the 
possibility of rain is the carrying of an umbrella.  Furthermore, on seeing an 
agent carrying an umbrella, one is generally aware the he believes there is a 
possibility of rain and that he intends to stay dry.  In this sense, Sittlichkeit is a 
“second nature”, the world is constituted by social rather than natural 
reasons for action.  [PR, §151]   
One more point needs to be made.  These reasons remain reflective 
even if they are not reflected upon.  This difference is probably best illustrated 
by Hegel’s own distinction between reflective (the state) and unreflective 
trust (the family).  The difference lies in the possibility of articulating and 
therefore sharing one’s reasons for action.  If I am to save my child from 
drowning or, on a lesser scale, to provide for the material needs of my family, 
I cannot truly articulate the reason why I fulfil this role.  The best I can manage 
is “Because they are my family.”  Moreover, someone who demands that I 
justify my reasons for these actions is simply inhuman, not in the sense of evil, 
but in the sense that they cannot truly comprehend what it is to be a human 
being.  These reasons, then, are immediate and unreflective and trust in one’s 
family members is based on the same disposition.19  The reflective trust in the 
state, however, is open to scrutiny; this is the formal requirement of subjective, 
moral freedom.  It is perfectly sensible to demand a justification of a 
particular law, social duty or more and why I should act in accordance with 
it.  The point is, agents rarely do demand justification and as such express a 
reflective trust in their state; its laws and institutions are open to legitimation 
and the state must make the scrutiny by the agent possible, but this need not 
be carried through every time a demand on the citizen is made.  A useful 
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analogy is differentiation in mathematics.  All of us are quite happy to use the 
formula “nxn-1”, but in order for us to be certain it must be possible for us to 
carry out the calculation from first-principles.  The laws of the state are a type 
of shorthand of the good, but which must remain possible objects of 
legitimation even when not perpetually legitimated. 
Consequently, the subject as a member of this order has an identity 
which motivates him in certain situations: 
… subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal 
rational will, which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in the 
consciousness of the individual subject, whilst its practical 
operation and immediate universal actuality at the same time exist 
as moral usage, manner and custom where self-conscious liberty 
has become nature. [EG, §513] 
It is this which overcomes the abstract and formal nature of the ‘ought’ which 
results from the subjective will: “Thus, without any selective reflection, the 
person performs duty as his own and as something which is; and in this 
necessity he has himself and his actual freedom.” [EG, §514]  The member of 
Sittlichkeit can perform his duties – possibly from habit, that is without any 
“selective reflection” – because they constitute his identity.  It is not how he 
should act, it is how he does act (I drive on the left because I am English) and 
he can be certain of recognition as an agent through fulfilling the dictates of 
these roles.  The subject has “trust” in the objective social order and its 
rationality. [EG, §525; PR, §147]  (It is similar to “trusting” that it will rain on 
seeing clouds: the underlying rationality need not always be made 
apparent.)  Sittlichkeit can therefore be best understood as: 
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All these substantial determinations are duties which are binding 
on the will of the individual; for the individual, as subjective and 
inherently undetermined – or determined in a particular way – is 
distinct from them and consequently stands in a relationship to 
them as to his own substantial being. [PR, §148] 
It is both the objective social order embedded in institutions and also the 
substantial identity of the agent as a member of these institutions.   
 
§5| The dangers of the purely objective will 
The aim of this paper was to show that Hegel’s immanent doctrine of duty 
arose not just from his rejection of transcendental ethics but also from his own 
account of human moral action.  I believe I have shown above that Hegel’s 
theory of action necessarily requires objective freedom which can only be 
supplied by Sittlichkeit even if I have not gone into the fine details of his 
account of ethical substance.  In justifying this claim it was also hoped that 
an answer could be ventured on the question whether Hegel does or does 
not negate the subjective right – or moral conscience – in the full account of 
Sittlichkeit offered in the third section of the Philosophy of Right.  This question 
is to be answered by asking whether such a negation could actually be 
consistent with his theory of action as it has been presented here. 
It has often been supposed that the account of objective freedom 
demands too much: if Sittlichkeit is immediately motivating through habit or 
second nature without “selective reflection,” then is the slave free in acting 
out the duties of the slave?  The right of the rational, after all, was to be “firmly 
established” and it is clear that Hegel's theory of action implicitly involves the 
notion of Sittlichkeit in that the moral agent requires objective determination 
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to be certain of recognition and, hence, to be fully responsible. Hegel is 
emphatic in the restriction of the sphere of subjective freedom by the right of 
objectivity: that is, the subject’s good must be intelligible in terms of his place 
within Sittlichkeit, yet this seems to swallow the possibility of protest.  What 
happens when the right of subjective freedom (I do not satisfy myself in the 
actions of a slave) comes into collision with objective freedom which 
demands that I fulfil these duties to be comprehended?20 
It is the objective structure of Hegel’s account of Sittlichkeit which 
grounds the non-liberal interpretations of his work.  In the third section of the 
Philosophy of Right Hegel lists, interrogates and attempts to actualise the 
social institutions which existed in the Prussian state; at each step of the 
argument, the subjectivity of individuals appears to play second fiddle to the 
role demanded by the institution itself.  However, it is perhaps best to divide 
the problem into a strong and a weak version and to respond to them 
separately.  The strong challenge to Hegel’s social philosophy is this: the 
moral conscience described in “Morality” is negated in the section “Ethical 
Life”, which is to say objective freedom trumps subjective freedom.21  The 
duties of the agent in ethical life are to fulfil his or her roles adequately and 
freedom consists solely in actions which are in accordance with one’s duties.  
There is no possibility of social critique, no way to protest against the 
obligations of my role because such action will not conform with the 
categories which give my action meaning and will become mere wilfulness. 
Yet, if one is to take seriously the role of the moral theory of action 
which precedes the account of ethical life, then it is clear that subjectivity still 
has a role to play in the objective freedom of Sittlichkeit.  For Hegel, moral 
subjectivity remains a necessary and integral part of the free, rational state.  
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The quotation which best reflects the right of knowledge within Sittlichkeit 
stresses this necessity: “When the existing world of freedom has become 
unfaithful to the better will, this will no longer finds itself in the duties 
recognized in this world and must seek to recover in ideal inwardness alone 
that harmony which it has lost in actuality.” [PR, §138, remark]  The subjective 
constraint, then, must be reciprocally effective on the objective order of 
things and is so through the necessity that the actualisation of social ideality 
requires self-conscious knowledge: the free, rational state is not one in which 
the institution of slavery could exist; its rationality cannot be actualised as all 
persons are to be considered equals in the free, rational state. [PR, §§36, 155]  
Thus, the subjective constraint may be ruled by the rational, but so must 
objective freedom: to bring out the implicit rationality underlying a social 
custom, that is to actualise it, requires that the subjective will be capable of 
endorsing it; or, finding it rational for itself.  This involves the implicit right of 
knowledge and subjective freedom.  This is the difference which Hegel 
repeatedly marks between Ancient Greek society and modern society.22  
 This Hegelian response depends upon rational legitimation which is 
governed by endorsement.  For an act to be moral, rather than just 
intelligible, the agent must know and endorse the reason why he acts.  A 
reason in-itself rational is immediately motivating.  It serves to explain an act.  
‘Why does the child wear his seat-belt?’  ‘Because otherwise his mother will 
shout at him.’  The real reason is for the child’s safety, yet the child is unaware 
of this fact.  The reason in-itself, that is, the fear of punishment is particular to 
this child.  It binds and obliges only this particular agent to wear his seatbelt 
(the reason explicitly refers to his own mother).  However, the rationality of the 
act is present in the idea of safety.  As the child grows, he comes to realise 
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that the reason for wearing a seatbelt is to protect himself; that is, he 
recognises the good as his own.  He rationally legitimates the act – or 
actualises the latent rationality of the existing structure – and recognises that 
not only is he reasonable to his mother and her expectations, but also to 
himself: this is an act which is rational for him not just his mother.  This reflects 
the inherently social nature of reason-giving described above.  Only when 
objective freedom makes possible the satisfaction of desires which can be 
freely chosen, known and transparent, is the agent fully responsible.  Thus, for 
fully free, responsible action, the right of knowledge has to be met.  Only 
when the agent is recognised as responsible is he fully free and only when 
agents are fully free is a social order rational. 
 The rational system of the will’s self-determination, for modern man, is 
self-conscious knowledge of the underlying necessity implicit in the customs 
and mores of Sittlichkeit.  It is ‘customary’ to wear a seatbelt, and one wears 
it without much “selective reflection,” but, it is possible to actualise the 
custom; that is, to make apparent its rationality to the knowing subject.  It is 
obvious that the reason accords with the subject’s personal and moral 
freedom and is rational.  It seems that a subject is only responsible when his 
motivations are reflectively endorsed.  Otherwise one must speak of force or 
coercion with an appropriate reason for action such as fear, embarrassment, 
et al.  This is to again invoke Hegel’s right of knowledge.  Such rationality is 
embodied in social customs and determines reasons for actions for the 
member of specific institutions, workplaces and families. one can 
demonstrate to oneself and to others that the action is justified by a reason 
which meets the requirements of the rights of knowledge and intention.  
Objective freedom makes possible the satisfaction of subjective freedom, 
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rather than – as many commentators hostile to the Hegelian picture suppose 
– determining the content of subjective freedom. 
 The right of knowledge is, therefore, not negated in the third section of 
The Philosophy of Right, but it becomes the social practice of expressing 
rational action.  Social roles do not determine an agent, they make rational 
action in pursuit of the good possible.  This brings us to the more telling 
weaker version of the challenge, though.  If reason giving is inherently social 
as Hegel holds, then surely the tendency will be – in cases of conflict 
between individual good and social good – to side with the familiar and 
conventional.  With the stronger form of the challenge, social protest is 
impossible and irrational, but this is to negate absolutely the right of 
knowledge of the subject.  The weaker form of the challenge does not fully 
negate the right to knowledge: one is able to deny the determinations of 
one’s role when one cannot endorse its rationality.  However, given that this 
endorsement is a social practice, protest stemming from the moral 
conscience is ultimately mute since the right of objectivity, that my actions 
be rational for others, implicitly commits Hegel to conservatism.  Endorsement 
amounts to nothing more than yes-saying: the subject reflects upon his duties 
and recognises that they accord with objective determinations.  The strong 
challenge pictured Hegel rather unconvincingly as a strong communitarian 
who believed agents are identical with (rather than identified with) their roles.  
The weaker challenge is more persuasive, Hegel appears committed to 
conservatism which means subjective freedom may be compromised by 
social pressure because the social nature of reason-giving means the 
conventional will often trump the true. 
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The first point to mention in response to this is to simply admit Hegel is a 
conservative, that much is clear both from his continued critique of the use of 
abstract right in political theorising and in his tinkerings with – rather than 
overhaul of – the Prussian state.23  Furthermore, the reasons for his 
conservatism, especially in the aftermath of the French Revolution, are 
perhaps justified.  However, conservatism does not necessarily commit him to 
quietism in the face of one’s duties in the state.  A protest against the claims 
of my role, and ultimately against the sate, will arise when my moral 
conscience dictates a good which comes into conflict with the good of my 
role.  If the good can be justified as a legitimate good recognised by others, 
then the subject is in the position once more of non-freedom: his will suffers 
from duality.  If the good cannot be justified to others, then the individual is 
being arbitrary.  Critics of conservatism will hold that the latter will always be 
the case since Hegel holds that the good is determined by Sittlichkeit.  
However, this is only if the goods of citizen, worker and family member 
harmonise.  If they do not, then there is room for the moral conscience and 
right of knowledge to legitimately challenge the authority of the state 
expressed through the dictates of those roles. 
How is one to understand this given Hegel’s overall political and social 
theory?  The paradigm case of protest on the basis of moral conscience 
would be the breaking of laws or the non-fulfilment of duties in order to refuse 
the state’s decision to fight in an unjust war.  If the charge of conservatism is 
correct, then the subject reflectively questions but ultimately endorsees his 
role as citizen to fight when the state calls on him to do so.  The rational 
endorsement Hegel offers will be seen as no better than a mere yes-saying to 
authority. 
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On liberal accounts, social protest is permitted when the state 
demands something which threatens those very interests which it is supposed 
to protect.  Hence, the agent will be obliged to fight in a war in which his 
interests are protected or furthered (broadly speaking), but not to throw 
away his life for any other reason.  Thus, one can say the agent has a positive 
political duty to obey the laws of the state and fulfil the duties of his role 
within the state and that this is based on a prior natural political duty which is 
to comply with the political order based on a deeper account of moral 
justice or the good which positive law is enacted in order to protect and 
secure.  Thus, for social contract theorists, one consents to the state in order 
to secure and further one’s natural rights, and this consent can be taken 
back when the state no longer protects or secures these rights. 
However, for Hegel the state is good in itself and not just as a means to 
attain the good for its members.  He is able to agree with the positive political 
duty above (although it is perhaps better to speak of positive ethical duties in 
his case), but his reasons for doing so are not based on a natural duty, since 
without the state, the agent cannot be moral.  The state is essential for the 
subject’s morality and hence it embodies or makes possible morality, rather 
than protecting and enforcing it.  If this is the case, then obviously one’s 
morality is only at odds with one’s social order when one is mistaken.  The 
weak challenge seems to be correct and severely limit the role of the moral 
conscience in Hegel’s full social theory. 
This is where I believe a proper understanding of Hegel’s theory of 
action demonstrates that, though Hegel is a conservative, he does leave 
room for social critique.  The theory of action allows one to offer a Hegelian 
alternative to the liberal natural political duty.  For Hegel, this is the role which 
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is to be played by objective freedom: the agent’s natural duty to comply 
with positive political duty is due to the fact it makes him independent (of 
needs and illegitimate authority), self-willed and certain of recognition by 
others.  In short, the agent obeys positive law in order to be free and freedom 
is the fundamental value embodied and made possible by a rational state.  
Remember, that without the subjective endorsement of the morally free 
agent, the duties of Sittlichkeit are not actual duties. [PR, §138, remark] 
Thus, protest is permitted when positive political (ethical) duties 
contravene the natural duty, that is when objective freedom no longer 
maintains the agent’s subjective freedom and, therefore, his humanity.  A 
state can only be free when its members are free, similarly a subject can only 
be free in a free state.  If the moral conscience is a mere yes-saying then they 
are not fully free, it is necessary that endorsement is more robust. If a motive is 
to justify an action as well as explain it, then it must be known by the agent 
himself and it is this self-conscious knowledge which constrains objective 
freedom: the subject can only endorse those reasons which do not obstruct 
or (irrationally) limit his subjective freedom.  Sittlichkeit is a second nature, but 
it is not unconscious or hidden.  The right of subjective freedom remains so 
that the rationality implicit in social customs can be endorsed and is not just 
accepted.  The inviolable right of knowledge present in the theory of action 
holds good in ethical life: the subject’s description of his intention has to be 
enabled by the objective freedom of ethical life if it is to meet the criterion of 
responsibility.  The principle of action is internalised and made one’s own: 
“This essential being is the union of the subjective with the rational will: it is the 
moral Whole, the State, which is that form of reality in which the individual has 
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and enjoys his freedom; but on condition of his recognising, believing in, and 
willing that which is common to the whole.” [VPG; p. 55/38] 
This allows a space for social criticism originating from the moral 
conscience.  For example, the duties of her role as citizen inhibited 
Antigone’s freedom in dividing her will between family and state law and 
hence making self-determination impossible.  Historical examples would 
include slavery and apartheid in which fulfilling one’s civil role inhibits one’s 
personal freedom.  Similarly, on Hegel’s own account, his descriptions of the 
role of women in the family, the rigidity of social class and the postulation of a 
hereditary monarch possibly contradict the requirements of equality and 
careers open to talents which he espouses as necessary for the state to be 
rational.  Moreover, these institutions make it impossible for certain agents to 
fulfil themselves as human beings since other agents cannot recognise what 
they truly are: they remain identical with their role and, hence, not free.  
These, of course, are open to interpretation and I only throw them somewhat 
glibly in here to demonstrate that, though Hegel’s conservatism does not rule 
out social criticism stemming from the moral conscience, he is often – I 
believe – guilty of lazy conservatism in describing elements of institutions 
which are not rational on his own account.  Such a discussion is, however, 
beyond the scope of this paper, but these do illustrate possible areas in which 
the moral conscience has a proper claim against the duties of the state and 
this is but an extension of the theory of action’s stress on responsible, free 
agency.  To return to the paradigm case, the waging of an unjust war would 
be impossible for free subjects to endorse and to remain fully free, as Hegel 
describes it, although, he does leave rather a broad definition of just war. [PR, 
§§325-328]  Again, I feel it is sensible to interrogate his substantial claims with 
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his own earlier theory, but this paper has sought only to ground such a 
critique (and, consequently, any critique of our own social fabric) rather than 
carry it through. 
 
§5| Conclusion 
The moral  point of view remains an integral part of the rational state, but not 
because it generates moral principles.  Determinations of the will arise from 
the institutions and their conception of the good in which the agent 
participates.  It is the endorsement of institutional, objective dictates when 
they meet both the constraints of objective and subjective freedom.  The 
account of subjectivity generated by Hegel’s theory of action places certain 
demands on ethical life.  Ethical life constitutes the objective freedom of the 
agent in that it determines the limits to his subjective freedom, but if a 
particular desire, aspiration or project is not possible – or, worse, if ethical life 
coerces the subject into appropriating a role which obstructs the satisfaction 
of subjective freedom – then, the subject is not wholly responsible for his 
action and, thus, not fully free.  The objective constraint rules out unintelligible 
and wrong behaviour in that the agent knows right and wrong through the 
dictates of his institutions and from his substantial identity.  Reciprocally, the 
subjective constraint rules out false consciousness and irrational institutions in 
that the good of the moral will must be satisfied:  
Freedom is only present where there is no other for me that is not 
myself.  The natural man, who is determined only by his drives, is 
not at home with himself; however self-willed he may be, the 
content of his willing and opining is not his own, and his freedom is 
only a formal one. [EL, §23, second addition] 
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For man to be free – that is, to be at home with himself – the content of his will 
must be his own.  For the existing social world to be actualised, then the 
underlying rationality of its dictates and obligations has to be known and 
endorsed by the thinking subject, but such an endorsement cannot be mere 
yes-saying (or formal as the above quotation describes it).24  Freedom is 
formal when I am able to satisfy my desires (personal freedom), but it is 
substantial when I satisfy desires which are my good.  Yet, this does not rule 
out coercion for my benefit (the child).  In order for a human being to be fully 
free, his will must be satisfied, substantial and moral (the good must be 
recognised as his own good, not merely his own unreflective good).  This is 
the role of moral freedom and without it, the will of man is no better than the 
slave or the child. [PR, §26]25  The purely subjective will is arbitrary, whereas 
the purely objective will can have unethical content; they have to 
reciprocally constrain one another.  The subjective will remains an integral 
part of modern Sittlichkeit. 
It was suggested that the account of subjectivity which arises from a 
thorough reading of Hegel’s theory of action plays a determinate role in 
Sittlichkeit.  It does so because the two central concepts of the third section 
of the Philosophy of Right – that is, subjective and objective freedom – 
originate from the rights of knowledge, intention and objectivity of the action 
which characterise the abstract acting, moral will.  Objective freedom is 
necessary for and supplements – which, is to say, ethical life actualises – 
personal and moral freedom.  Without the categories of ethical life, it would 
be impossible to form judgements concerning the intentions of others.  Thus, it 
is the substantial form of the right of objectivity of an action.  Reciprocally, 
subjective freedom interrogates and justifies objective freedom.  If the 
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subject cannot, or is obstructed from, satisfying his rational desires, then he is 
not free and responsible.  He, then, has a legitimate claim against the state 
arising from his own moral conscience.  So long as the claim in unresolved, 
freedom is an impossibility and the institutions of ethical life are no longer 
rational.  It is this right of knowledge which constitutes the role of the moral will 
in Sittlichkeit.  Morality remains an essential element of modern Sittlichkeit 
since, to actualise the rationality of existing social structures, this rationality 
has to be self-consciously known.  This should serve to dispel the myth that 
Hegel is a hard communitarian who believes that a subject can be described 
only in terms of his role and membership in a society.  Objective freedom 
does not envelop subjective freedom since the goods of my social being 
have to be endorsed as my own goods.  Therefore, the reciprocity of 
subjective and objective freedom allows man to actualise his existing social 
order through the maximal rationalisation of his institutions and customs. 
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Abbreviations to the cited works of Hegel: 
All references are given by paragraph (§) or page (p.) number.  Where the German 
and English references differ, the German is given first. 
EG Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundisse dritter Teil: 
Die Philosophie des Geistes Moldenhauer, E & Michel, K eds. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp; 1993 
Philosophy of Mind: Part 3 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences 
with the Zusätze trans. Wallace, W & Miller, A Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 1971 
EL  Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundisse erster Teil: 
Die Logik Moldenhauer, E & Michel, K eds. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; 
1993 
The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical 
Sciences with the Zusätze trans. Geraets, T, Suchting, A & Harris, H 
Indianapolis, USA: Hackett Publishing Co.; 1991 
NL Über die wissenscaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle 
in der praktischen Philosophie und sein Verhältnis zu den positiven 
Rechtswissenschaften; pp. 453-480 in Jenaer Schriften 1801-1807 
Moldenhauer, E & Michel, K eds. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; 1990 
On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, on its Place in Moral 
Philosophy, and its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Right; pp. 118-139 
in Political Writings trans. Nisbet, H Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
1999 
PR Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts Moldenhauer, E & Michel, K eds. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; 1993 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right trans. Nisbet, H Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1991 
VPG Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte Moldenhauer, E & 
Michel, K eds. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; 1992 
Philosophy of History trans. Sibree, J New York: Prometheus Books; 1991 
 
Notes: 
1 For Hegel’s criticisms of Kant’s moral will, the fullest account is to be found in NL.  The 
criticisms found there recur often in the lectures and other works.  For the 
contemporary debate itself, one should refer to Allision, H Kant’s Theory of Freedom 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990, especially chapter ten; Korsgaard, C 
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Creating the Kingdom of Ends Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1996, chapter 
three; O’Neill, O Constructions of Reason Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
1989, part two; O’Hagan, T “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political 
Philosophy” in Hegel’s Critique of Kant ed. Priest, S Oxford: Clarendon; 1987; Pippin, R 
Idealism as Modernism Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997, part one; and 
Wood, A “The Emptiness of the Moral Will” in Monist vol. 72, 1989; pp. 454-483. 
2 The best and most convincing account of this charge can be found in Tugendhat, E 
Self-consciousness and Self-determination trans. Stern, P London: MIT Press; 1986, chs. 
13-14.  A less sophisticated, yet more famous, version is of course Karl Popper’s in The 
Open Society and its Enemies vol. 2 Third Edition London: Routledge; 1957 chapters 11 
and 12. 
3 For examples of this approach to Hegel, the reader should refer to Patten, A Hegel’s 
Idea of Freedom Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1999; Neuhouser, F Foundations of 
Hegel’s Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom London: Harvard University Press; 2000; 
and the final chapter of Pippin 1997 as well as his article “What is the Question for 
which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition is the Answer?” in European Journal of 
Philosophy vol. 8, no.2, Aug 2000, pp. 155-172. 
4 Hegel should not be confused with liberal theorists, though.  He does not hold that 
the common good is derived from the interests of individuals abstracted from a social 
group, but rather the common good is independent of the interests of individuals.  In 
other words, the common good is not only valuable as a means to individual goods, 
but it is valuable in itself and to be a fully free human being I must desire the common 
good as my own.  It shall be made clear why he holds this below.  For a slightly 
different discussion of this, see Neuhouser, op-cit., ch. 6. 
5 In Neuhouser op-cit., for example, the consideration of Hegel’s social philosophy 
begins with the full account of social freedom, devoting only nine brief pages to its 
origin in the earlier forms of freedom, viz. personal and moral. 
6 Kant, I The Critique of Pure Reason trans. Meiklejohn, J & revised Politis, V London: J 
M Dent, 1993 pp. Aix-xi. 
7 The reader, at this juncture, may begin to wonder whether we could map Hegel’s 
thought on reasons for action on to the contemporary internalist-externalist 
distinction.  My intuition would say yes that Hegel’s position is one which admits both 
internal and external reasons, but holds that fully free action must be on the basis of 
internal reasons.  However, I would like to leave this to a later investigation, purely 
because it would involve the present article in concerns which distract from its main 
aim. 
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8 A proviso should be added in that the right of the intention has an objectivity which 
holds that the action must include knowledge which the agent should know.  Thus, 
the arsonist who says he only wanted to light one blade of grass is responsible for the 
destruction of the field, because he should have known that it was a likely outcome.  
Cf. PR, §119, addition. 
9 Such necessity is called for when an agent’s actions continually contradict avowed 
intentions, as would be the case with neurotic symptoms, for example. 
10 The contemporary characterisation would be second-order desires.  See Frankfurt, 
H “Freedom of the will and the concept of a person” and Taylor, C “Responsibility for 
self” both in Free Will ed. Watson, G Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
11 Willing of this sort is necessary for Civil Society, thus it cannot be exclusively moral.  
Duties, then, can also be prudential (I ought to take out a pension plan) and self-
interested (I ought to buy this because I like it).  The judgement involved in this second 
criterion appraises and ranks desires in an order of priority made in relation to a 
conception of the good. 
12 His culpability is a legal issue arising form the consideration of what an agent ought 
to know on setting foot within a state.  One should not expect a beef steak in India, 
for example.  This is picked up below in the paper when it is clearly demonstrated that 
the right of objectivity not only determines who is responsible, but also who should be 
held responsible for ignorance. 
13 Obviously, in terms of Sittlichkeit, this shared scheme of interpretation will demand 
more.  For Hegel’s account as a whole, a demonstration of the logical unity of 
Sittlichkeit and objective freedom – in that it enables satisfaction of subjective 
freedom for the subject who inhabits the rational state and not just any form of life – is 
necessary.  At this point, though, the concern is merely with morality and the 
harmonisation of the agent’s intention with the other’s interpretation of it, and, as 
such, it need only rely on a shared set of values, meanings and significations as 
concerns action. 
14 This in itself is related in the same way to the metaphysical freedom of the self-
determining subject which Hegel describes in his introduction, see PR §§4-27 and also 
the author’s own doctoral thesis locked up in Glasgow University Library: Rose, D 
Freedom and Modernity: a Hegelian synthesis of social freedom and freedom of 
action 2000, chs. 1-5. 
15 Locke, J An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil 
Govenrment in Two Treatises of Government ed. Laslett, P Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, chs. 1-5.  For a more detailed discussion of my point, see 
Knowles, D “Hegel on Property and Personality” in Philosophical Quarterly vol. 33; no. 
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130; 1983; pp. 45-62. 
16 As the “person” is the subject of abstract right and the “subject” is of morality, so 
the “ethical person” is the subject of social freedom.  The citizen refers explicitly to a 
specific role (the properly political) within the social realm. 
17 The best account of these categories of the social realm is to be found in Patten 
op-cit. 
18 There is the further stipulation that an objectively free society must be self-
determining, that is free in-itself.  I here ignore this only because I cannot do justice to 
the claim in these pages without digressing from my main concern.  A good 
discussion of this can be found in Neuhouser, op-cit. ch. 4. 
19 This is perhaps why the abuse of children by their parents is such a reprehensible 
crime, there is a certain element of inhumanity in it which horrifies us. 
20 One immediate Hegelian response would be to invoke an objective, absolutist 
account of the end of history: man inhabits the purely rational state where social and 
individual good harmonise and do so due to the rationality of the institutions which 
exist.  Objective freedom meets the requirements of subjective freedom and no 
conflicts between the two can possibly arise.  However, it would be necessary to offer 
a thorough description of the nature of the end of history, to acknowledge that 
Hegel's intuitions concerning certain moral problems and our own differ markedly, to 
admit that it is in no way obvious that modern institutions could deal with future moral 
problems and, given all these, to reconsider the end of history as purely an objective 
state of affairs.  All of this is well beyond the remit of this paper. 
21 This is the view of Tugendhat op-cit. 
22 See VPG, pp. 134/104; 137-8/106-7; 417/444-5. 
23 Hegel’s best expression of his critique of abstract right is in NL, but also see 
“Absolute Freedom and Terror” in PhG. 
24 It is worth noticing that “formal” is also the adjective assigned to the right of 
knowledge and subjective freedom in PR.  I think what it means is that when I choose 
x, it is only formal freedom when I do not freely will the end as a good (the substantial 
element).  However, when we move to the moral level, the formal element, that my 
end be endorsed by me is only true freedom when I am sure that it is in fact a good 
(the substantial element).  So, we need to move to a substantial account of the 
good, hence ethical life. 
25 In this paragraph, Hegel also – albeit obliquely – acknowledges the dangers of 
what I called the purely objective will, for it is not only the will of the child or the slave, 
but also the "ethical [sittliche] will" – that is the ethical will which is not actual or not 
self-knowing – which is a will totally immersed in its content. 
